A's Postseason Decision Points: The 2014 AL Wildcard Game

"It was a savage beating for A's fans. It was the type of beating that drives a sober man to drink, makes a religious person question their belief in God. And makes the atheists think, 'Maybe, I should've been praying all along.' It was that kind of 'look at your life' loss, that A's fans suffered last night." - Damon Bruce 10/1/14 on 95.7 The Game

I've tried to write something about this several times, but I've ended up stopping because I fear that I'll go crazy trying to digest it again.

I finally finished watching that awful game again. That same game that left me wide-eyed in a San Leandro pub with all my friends. Plenty of the emotions that I experienced that night were reborn on this night. I was planning on making a sequel to the first edition of this series, which was Game 4 of the 2013 ALDS, that was easier, for some reason. That game had a lot of easy things to analyze which made me quite critical of Bob Melvin's managing in that matchup.

I expected to find the same things in this game, and honestly, I was wrong. I did find a few decision points to dive into, but it's not the scathing review that I gave Bob Melvin in the last edition. Instead, I discovered that he was very unlucky and that the players on the field just didn't execute.

This game stung more because of all the build up that happened with the mid-season trades, and the massive regression during the last two months of the season. And with the loss, we'd later find out that this game had closed the championship window for that particular core of A's players. The Donaldson, Moss, Reddick, and Crisp Oakland A's had seen the last of their opportunities of making a big October playoff run. And that's what stung more than anything else.

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Our first decision point rears its head in the 8th inning, but here's a brief recap.

The A's were hitting Royals starter, James Shields, quite hard, most notably, Brandon Moss' 2-run home run.

Then the Royals exploited Jon Lester's inability to hold runners on, combined with the injury to Geovany Soto, and the writing was on the wall for future trouble.

The Royals would take the lead in the 3rd, and afterward, Lester would find his groove, after finding his curveball.

Then Royals manager, Ned Yost, went completely brain dead with probably one of the worst decisions I can remember during the postseason. As an in-game tactical manager, he's better than Ron Washington, maybe better than Dusty Baker, but only just.

He had already tried a little league set play with Billy Butler trying to draw a throw, and that predictably failed, so he had to top it with another dumb decision.

With Brandon Moss up with two men on, Yost pulled Shields and went to Yordano Ventura, who was making his first appearance out of the bullpen. What made it even worse was that Ventura was on one day's rest, and he was coming in with runners on base. All of it seemed terrible, and Brandon Moss made Yost pay with a 3-run home run to put the A's in front. The A's would stretch the lead to 7-3 by the end of the 6th, and the A's seemed to have an insurmountable lead, thanks to Ned Yost's huge gaff. He should've brought in his dynamite reliever, Kelvin Herrera, and the only reason he didn't, is because it wasn't the 7th inning, so there you have it.

Jon Lester would cruise through the sixth and seventh innings, bringing the A's within six outs of advancing to the ALDS.

Decision Point #1: Letting Lester go out for the 8th

Here's Lester's pitching line after 7:  94 pitches, 7.0 IP, 25 BF, 6 H, 3 ER, 5 K, 1 BB, 57 Game Score.

That's a solid outing.

 Lester had retired 13 of the last 14 since giving up runs in the 3rd. He was on a roll, and in those innings, he looked more like we hoped he would. And with a 4 run lead, myself, and everyone around me at the pub were convinced that Jon Lester should go out for the 8th. He had shown no signs of struggling in the early part of the game, and I also think that our biases about the postseason and how you're supposed to use your ace in a game like this crept into our minds.

The truth is, we were wrong. We were wrong in hindsight, but we were all wrong, and so was Bob Melvin.

The bottom line is that after a starting pitcher goes through the batting order more than three times, he becomes dramatically less effective compared to the first couple times. All due to fatigue and the opposing batters seeing the starter's repertoire enough times to pick up on it.

Jon Lester was facing the Royals batting order for the 4th time. That should've been enough for Melvin to swallow his instincts about letting your ace win you the game, and do the practical thing and bring in your rested bullpen with a four-run lead.

Even if he made Lester start the 8th, he should've been given a quick hook. Instead, he faced six extra batters. Melvin's not alone in making this mistake, many of his colleagues make the same mistake in managing like it's 1911, but let's hope that this reinforces the point over time.

That brings us to our next decision.

Decision Point #2: Using Luke Gregerson with runners on base

I	Split	G	PA	AB	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip	tOPS+
	RISP	240	524	452	22	4	13	9	0	51	114	2.24	.221	.307	.374	.681	.264	128
	---	441	1114	1043	40	2	20	0	0	65	303	4.66	.200	.251	.300	.551	.263	85

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 2/28/2016.

The table above shows Luke Gregerson's career statistics when runners are in scoring position, versus bottom column which shows his statistics when no one is on base. This might be a bit anecdotal since it's probably sure that all pitchers have similar statistics like this.

I would've brought Gregerson in, to start the inning, but he was the wrong guy in this situation, because of his pitching repertoire. His slider is one that often finds the dirt, and with runners on base, there's added pressure to block his pitches, and there's even some tendency to stray away from his slider in this situation which is a trend that would severely neuter the effectiveness of Luke Gregerson.

Gregerson would end up threading the needle with this slider; one ended up being a wild pitch that brought in the Royals' 6th run while the others produced back to back strikeouts that ended the inning.

Here's the sequence of the inning.

Instead of letting Lester pitch to Hosmer, I would've taken him out after he gave up the hit to Cain. And in that position, there're two ways to go about it. First, he could've gone to Dan Otero to try and bring in a guy who could produce a ground ball. Or he could've brought in Sean Doolittle his closer to try and get a five out save.

I would've brought in Sean Doolittle. Doolittle's your best reliever and this was the highest leverage situation you could draw up. Doolittle had 14 career appearances up to that point where he recorded 5 or more outs and in those appearances, he hadn't given up a single run. That proves he was not only capable of getting the job done. There's no reason to limit players to one inning, especially in the playoffs, where it's not only useful, but it should be recommended and done more often.

The 8th inning was a rough one for Melvin, and I worry that this example shows that he can't adapt on the fly when he needs to do so. Let's remember that Bob Melvin was the bench coach for Bob Brenly's Arizona Diamondbacks. Bob Brenly is widely known as one of the worst managers to win a World Series, and no one did more to hurt their team's championship hopes. I always worry that Melvin will manage like Bob Brenly in the worst possible moments, though for the most part, Bob Melvin doesn't resemble Bob Brenly.

ESPN's Keith Law mentioned the day after this game that when Melvin was in Arizona, he wasn't committed to bullpen roles. Though in this particular case he clearly did, it was the 8th inning, so he naturally went to Luke Gregerson, even though the circumstances didn't support doing so.

These first two points were my main criticisms of Melvin's managing in this particular game.

Decision Point #3 Bringing in Jonny Gomes to play the OF

The bottom of the 11th saw Coco Crisp forced out of the game, and Bob Melvin was forced to go to replace him. He had two clear choices: Jonny Gomes and Billy Burns. Melvin chose Jonny Gomes, and this happened in the bottom of the 12th.



Upon replay, the ball was uncatchable. What's clear though is that Gomes' inexperience in the outfield was exposed on this plate, he wasn't backing up Fuld, and instead was going to the ball. And that decision allowed Eric Hosmer to go to third and score on the next play.

I would've worked with Billy Burns. And I said that when the decision was made at the time. Mostly due to the fact Jonny Gomes has no defensive value, he has some value at the plate against lefties, but his spot was six spots away, and Jonny Gomes never got to bat in this game. And since the Royals had already used their lone lefty in Brandon Finnegan, Jonny Gomes would've been batting with no platoon advantage, which compromises any value he has in playing at all.

With Billy Burns, you get a tremendous outfield range with Burns, Fuld, and Reddick. There's no doubt that Hosmer is going to get an extra base hit, no matter who's out there on the field, but with Billy Burns and Sam Fuld playing, there's probably a better chance that Hosmer is held to a double.

Maybe that doesn't change the result in the game, but this decision also seemed to be a head-scratcher in a somewhat minor realm.

Decision Point #4: Hammel and Not Samardzija

This falls on Billy Beane and the brain trust who made the roster. And I figured it was worth noting. Jeff Samardzija was left off the roster, having pitched on Saturday and was slotted to start game one of the ALDS if the A's had won the wildcard game.

You can see why this was done. Using Samardzija in this game would've compromised him for the first couple games of the division series and probably would've meant that he Though I still think you have to keep your best players on the roster and try to win the coin flip game and then figure things out later.

Beane was likely trying to make sure that Scott Kazmir didn't have to pitch in game one, especially with how the Angels destroyed him weeks before. Though you still could've had a rotation like this in the ALDS.

Game One: Scott Kazmir or Jason Hammel
Game Two: Sonny Gray
Game Three: Jon Lester
Game Four: Jeff Samardzija
Game Five: Sonny Gray

Decision Point #5: Adam Dunn Rotting on the Bench


This talking point was something that came up again, and again, mostly for sentimental reasons. Since this would end up being Adam Dunn's last game of his career. And in that career, he had never played a single game in the postseason, so this was his chance. The problem was simple, how could Bob Melvin get him into the game? Brandon Moss' hip was so banged up that he could only DH, and that's a no brainer, you put Brandon Moss out there over a 35-year-old, Adam Dunn. And that decision was rewarded when Brandon Moss hit two home runs in this game. And when a player hits two home runs in one single game, in the one place where Adam Dunn can play, there's not much you can do; sentimental reasons be damned.

With that said, there're two instances where he could've potentially had been brought in and here's the first one of contention.



With the bases loaded and Jed Lowrie at the plate, the thinking from some was that this was the time to bring in Adam Dunn and go for the kill. The problem with this way of thinking is that Adam Dunn is an all-or-nothing hitter and more of a nothing hitter at this stage of his career. And in reality, what you need is a single that will likely bring in two runs and give you a three-run lead heading into the bottom of the 9th. Getting a single from Jed Lowrie is much more likely than getting ANY hit from Adam Dunn, especially against one of the best flame-throwing relievers in the game, Greg Holland. This was not the spot to use him.

And then there's the second possible spot.



You could've brought Adam Dunn in for Alberto Callaspo in this situation, but that tactically doubtful move worked out anyway. Bob Melvin said after the game that the Royals likely would've walked Dunn and that would've been a complete waste of a roster spot because then you'd have to let Adam Dunn play first where he'll play below average defense. Again, not the spot to bring him in.

In review, Bob Melvin got it right by not bringing Adam Dunn in, it's a shame, but there was no right spot to bring him in.

Aftermath

If you're looking for reasons to hold Bob Melvin's feet to the fire, this is not the game to do it. I'm a guy who's not 100% sold on Melvin, but overall, he was extremely unlucky in this game. I believe he got the 8th inning wrong, but the truth is, most MLB managers haven't exactly understood how their precious starting pitchers get dramatically less effective the more times through the order they go through. I'll hold it against him, but the one I'm more upset about is how he threw Luke Gregerson into an awful situation, and that's something he had been doing all year long, sadly.

This loss hurts even more to this day because of what has happened since then with the Giants somehow winning another World Series in ways that will only be described as variance. I hope everyone enjoyed this review, or somehow found some closure on that awful night in Kansas City, hopefully, the A's will be back in the playoffs sooner rather than later.


----- Wes

My Ridiculous Proposal: Promotion and Relegation in MLB

Disclaimer: This proposal is completely hypothetical, and I honestly believe in it, but I realize that the chances of something even remotely like this taking place are next to nil as it is. It's one of those things that's always on my mind, and I figured it was time to release it to the world. So please just read this with an open mind and try not to laugh. (No really, try not to laugh)

Tradition is overrated.

It just is.

Tradition is no excuse to settle for a closed system that rewards laziness and tanking.

So it's time for me to be the commissioner and make baseball the best sport in the country and revive our national pastime.

With that said, let's go right into my reforms before I decide how the game will transform overnight.

The Barebones Reforms

- The Abolishment of the MLB Draft
- All levels of baseball (more on that, shortly), will play 140 games
- Minor League Affiliated Clubs are all at this moment stripped of their Major League affiliation status, and they are all placed under the banner of "independent."
- All Amateur Players are eligible to sign with any baseball club of their choosing at the age of 18; this goes for all international players and American-born players
- With the abolition of the MLB Amateur Draft, a cap will be instituted, teams at any level of baseball are allowed a total pot of money to spend over ten years (the ten years will be decided from the start of a decade to the end of a decade). This pot goes for ALL signings, amateur signings, and professional signings. If a team spends over the allotted money, the team is automatically relegated to the division below them.
- To make sure that trades and other creative transactions continue, trading a player to another team will not be counted against the team's spending pot (this will make those players quite valuable in this system)
- Each team has the option to operate academies for junior players. Once the players turn 18, they will be given the choice to sign with any club of their choosing, or they can choose to play college baseball up until their junior season, which is when they'll be eligible to sign again.
- All teams must keep a roster of 50 players, 25 of them must be available for each games, the 25 not playing can play in a reserve league that will be created at each level of baseball
- Deciding those 50 players, MLB teams must pick 50 players in their minor league system and their Major League club and allow the rest of the players that were playing for their affiliations to sign with any team of their choosing
- The DH is instituted at EVERY single level of baseball (suck it, traditionalists)


That's a lot of reforms, isn't it? I told you that this was going to be complicated. And this is only the beginning.

Let me explain, the MLB Draft promotes tanking, and that can't be allowed to continue in a promotion and relegation system where teams are rightfully punished for their mismanagement and incompetence. A lot of these reforms will make much more sense when I outline how the levels of baseball will be organized from the top of the baseball pyramid and to the bottom.

The spending pot was something that I had to institute, only because of the fact that a completely free market system would allow the big spending teams to rule every single year, while a long term spending pot creates a system of competitive cycles that still allows for a certain amount of parity.

The North American Baseball Pyramid

We'll start with Major League Baseball, this league will now be known as the First Division. I've seen other proposals for promotion and relegation in MLB, and most of those lazy writers just split the league in half and make 15 teams play in the first division and 15 other teams play in the second division. And that's just not gonna work, if you're going to do this system, you have to do it right, and keeping all 30 teams in the first division is a must.

I haven't worked out the scheduling because I'm far from a sudoku master like the Stephenson's, so I'm just gonna make a gamble on this one. I'd like to see all 30 teams play each other in at least one three game series. And with the games that are left over, the teams will play their local rivals or other teams in close proximity.

The system is simple, the top four teams in the first division will play for the First Division Championship. I originally wanted to completely abolish the playoff system, but since Americans are obsessed with it (to a huge fault, by the way), I figured I'd keep a small remnant of the playoffs.

Using this year's MLB standings I'll indicate how my system would've played out this year.

First Round

1. St. Louis Cardinals vs. 4. Kansas City Royals (Best of 7)

2. Pittsburgh Pirates vs. 3. Chicago Cubs (Best of 7)

All games will be played at the team's stadium with the higher seeding. Sorry, there needs to be a real reward for having a better record, so there it is.

The winner of each series plays each other for the First Division Championship. And in that series, the first two games will be played at the stadium of the team with the higher seed, and games 3 and 4 will be at the stadium of the team with the lower seed. From there, games 5, 6, and 7 will alternate between venues. With of course, the team with the higher seed hosting game 7.

Now that we've solved the top of the league, let's focus our attention to the bottom.

Relegation in the First Division is simple, the three teams with the worst record will be relegated to the second division of North American Baseball. Being relegated is being forced to play in AAA, basically, for those who don't understand. Who takes their place will be explained in the organization of the second division.

Who would've been relegated this year? Let's see.

1. Philadelphia Phillies 63-99
2.  Cincinnati Reds 64-98
3. Atlanta Braves 67-95

Ruben Amaro, your ass is fired, and your team is headed to the second division!

If the 3rd worst team is tied with anyone, there will be a one game playoff to decide who is relegated, with the winner staying up to play in the First Division in the next season and the loser going down. If multiple teams are tied with the 3rd worst team, head to head will decide who stays up and who goes down.

Now Let's take a look at the Second Division

As it stands right now, there are two leagues in what was formally known as AAA, there was the Pacific Coast League, and there was the International League.

Scheduling stays the same from what it was before, and the shape of each league stays the same.

The teams with the best record in the Pacific Coast League and the International League automatically are promoted to the First Division to take the place of the Phillies and Reds.

The teams with the second best record in the PCL and International League will play a best of 5 series amongst themselves with the winner taking the place of the Atlanta Braves, and the team with the better record amongst the two will host all 5 games. If their records are identical, a coin flip will decide who hosts all five games.

How would this system look based on the 2015 standings?

Automatically Promoted to the First Division:
PCL: Oklahoma City Dodgers 86-58 (who would have to change their name)
IL: Columbus Clippers 83-61

Who plays in the make or break series?

Indianapolis Indians 83-61 vs Fresno Grizzlies 84-59 Best of 5


Now to explain the relegation process for the second division. This one is real simple and will start to seem redundant, the team with the worst record in the PCL along with the worst record in the IL will be automatically relegated to the third division. The teams with the second worst record in each league will play each other in a best of 5 to decide who stays up and who goes down into peril.

How would that have worked this year?

Automatically Relegated to the Third Division:
PCL: Salt Lake City Bees 58-86
IL: Pawtucket Red Sox 59-85 (Who would also have to change their name)

Who plays in the relegation series?

Toledo Mud Hens vs New Orleans Zephyrs Best of 5


Let's take a look at the Third and the Fourth Divisions

The third division and the fourth division are organized in the exact same ways, there are three leagues in each division so therefore it's quite easy to organize.

Who goes up? The team with the best record in each league is promoted to the next league up. The team with the worst record in each league will be relegated.

Let's take a look at how that would've worked this year.


Third Division Promotions:
Texas League: Corpus Christi Hooks 89-51
Southern League: Biloxi Shuckers 78-59
Eastern League: Reading Fightin Phils 80-61(Who would have to change their name)

Third Division Relegations:
Texas League: San Antonio Missions 60-80
Southern League: Jackson Generals 53-84
Eastern League: Portland Sea Dogs 53-89

Fourth Division Promotions:
California League: Visalia Rawhide 84-56
Carolina League: Myrtle Beach Pelicans 81-57
Florida State League: Clearwater Threshers 79-58

Fourth Division Relegations
California League: Lake Elsinore Storm 50-90
Carolina League: Wilmington Blue Rocks 62-77
Florida State League: Brevard County Manatees 55-80

I'll stop there, the fifth division would be organized under the current direction of the low-A leagues and so on from there onwards. Once the old minor league system moves into the lower depths of the North American Baseball Pyramid, the Independent League teams will make up the lower divisions. I realize that once teams are relegated there might be a real scramble to reorganize the leagues but special circumstances might have to be given toward the newly relegated team.

The system isn't perfect, but it's effective. Now let me explain the benefits of this system.

The Rewards of a Promotion and Relegation System in Baseball

Attendance numbers will rise at every stadium because of this new, exciting principle. And it won't just be for the teams that are doing really well, the teams who struggle will see their attendance soar because the stakes of each game will mean that much more with those teams fighting for their survival in many ways. This system revitalizes the pennant race, and the relegation battle concept will make every game important and therefore, something that is must see television and something that will make attendance rise. Teams like the Braves and Phillies would've seen pivotal games that would've kept the crowds coming and that's just the tip of the iceberg.

Notoriously cheap owners like Jeffrey Loria, the Wilpons, and the Monfort brothers will no longer be rewarded for their constant tanking and listless clubs. That is the best part about this system, teams are forced to compete every year, whether it's for titles or their survival.

While punishing bad ownership, this system also saves a lot of clubs and answers the questions about the various markets for baseball that are out there. Is Sacramento a market that would do well with quality level baseball? How about San Antonio? Or Indianapolis? Or San Jose? With this system, all these questions can be answered, and opportunistic businessman can buy teams in the lower divisions and make sure that they progress up the pyramid. This system opens a whole new market for those who want to own a share of a team.

And the best part is that local, civic identity is promoted in this system. Imagine the kinship among the teams in the lower levels and their community of fans, once this system has a generation that has grown up with this system, the amount of away support will probably grow substantially, especially with the rise in the amount of important games.

There's so many ways for our great game to benefit. New heroes, new markets, and new opportunities.

The Cons of this System

The main problem that most critics see with this system is that when a team like the Atlanta Braves is relegated to the second division, how do they survive? The answer is simple, yes, attendance may dramatically drop when a team is relegated but with new opportunities and more haste to buy better players and work your way back into the first division in the next season, the drop in attendance is only temporary.

There's a lot of scheduling issues that would have to be worked out, not to mention major disorganization once a few teams get promoted and relegated. Like for example, the San Antonio Missions would have to play in either the California League, the Carolina League, or the Florida State League. On some level, I'm sure there'd be a way to work around this, but that's an issue that would have to be fixed.


One Last Note

I'm sure many of you who are diehard traditionalists and are afraid of any real change in their world have hated every single second of reading this. And those people are probably thinking that I've been watching too much soccer, and my answer is that, yes, I am a soccer fan but I believe that promotion and relegation is the way to go, and there's a way to improve it as well.

And before anyone jumps into the comments after they find themselves in a major visceral reaction, I'll spare you the obvious: "NO, THE OWNERS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THIS." Why would they agree to anything that actually holds their performance accountable?


Leave your thoughts in the comments below, would love to hear if any of you have ideas to improve this.

A's Postseason Decision Points: Game 4 of the 2013 ALDS

Hello, A's fans, I've been thinking about doing a series like this, but I just didn't have the courage to look back at these games that have a scarring impact on my mind as an A's fan.

Here goes nothing.

I'll be looking back at decisive games where controversial decisions were made or not made, and I'll be giving my opinion on whether the right managerial decisions were made during these games. It's Monday Morning Quarterbacking done years later.

For some, this may be a tough walk down memory lane, for others, I hope it provides a little bit of clarity for what is usually a difficult subject to bring up.

So let's go back to the 2013 ALDS. The A's were in a series with the Detroit Tigers, and the A's led the series 2-1.

The 2013 A's were a team that gave the franchise some validation for their 2012 success, they would win a highly contested pennant race against the Texas Rangers and secure their second consecutive division title by winning 96 games.

Josh Donaldson had his breakout season, Jed Lowrie had a career year in Oakland, Coco Crisp went 20/20, and Bartolo Colon proved to be the ageless wonder in an incredible season at the age of 40 years old.

Bob Melvin's team was on a collision course with the team that had eliminated them the previous season, the Detroit Tigers.

And the first two games in Oakland were one-run contests where runs were at a premium. The teams would split the first two games and head to Detroit with the series even at 1.

In game three, the narrative would shift entirely with the A's hitting three home runs and hit around Anibal Sanchez to give the A's a pivotal 6-3 victory and give the A's a shot to wrap it all up the following day in Detroit.

At this point in the series, Miguel Cabrera was struggling to make any impact on the series thanks to a bum hamstring. And to that point, only Omar Infante was providing any real offensive firepower for the Tigers. The A's had hit four home runs in the series altogether while the Tigers hadn't homered at all.

For game 4, Dan Straily would take the hill for the A's and Doug Fister would oppose him for the Tigers. Straily at that time was still a guy who was considered to be a potentially solid Major League contributor since he was missing plenty of bats. And with the lack of decent starting pitchers with swing and miss stuff, the A's saw him as a good matchup for game 4.

And through the top of the 5th inning, the A's looked to be in control with the score 3-0, and Dan Straily was looking dominant. All thanks to Jed Lowrie and Coco Crisp. Lowrie would drive in Crisp in the first thanks to Coco's leadoff triple, and then Lowrie would homer off of Fister in the 5th with Crisp on first to give the A's a 3-0 lead.

Then came the bottom of the 5th. And that went something like this.

Fielder's hit to lead off the inning was the first hit that Straily had given up all day. Then Straily would give Victor Martinez a belt-high fastball that he'd get through the hole. And then on the big blow from Peralta, Straily questionably threw a 2-2 belt high fastball that was crushed for a game-tying 3-run home run. The broadcast booth of Buck Martinez and Dennis Eckersley questioned the call to throw that pitch, citing that Straily's slider had been on all afternoon.

The A's would then go quietly through the top of the 6th.

Then we get to our first decision point of the day.

Decision Point #1: Letting Straily face the top of the Tigers Order for the 3rd Time

From the surface, you may be wondering why I'm adding this into the mix of discussion since it wasn't an eventful inning by any means. However, just because things worked out, doesn't necessarily mean it was the right decision.

Starting Pitchers struggle when facing a lineup the third time through. Here's how Dan Straily fared when the lineup has turned over a few times.

Split	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ROE	BAbip
1st PA in G, as SP	27	243	219	15	44	4	0	8	20	51	2.55	.201	.272	.329	.600	1	.222
2nd PA in G, as SP	27	242	217	28	53	9	0	7	21	48	2.29	.244	.317	.382	.699	4	.284
3rd PA in G, as SP	25	149	125	21	32	9	0	1	16	25	1.56	.256	.347	.352	.699	2	.304

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

I	Split	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	1st PA in G, as SP	45	405	361	37	78	8	1	18	1	0	36	88	2.44	.216	.295	.393	.688	.233
	2nd PA in G, as SP	45	404	366	43	84	16	0	13	1	1	33	82	2.48	.230	.296	.380	.676	.261
	3rd PA in G, as SP	43	246	205	36	54	15	1	6	0	2	30	38	1.27	.263	.365	.434	.799	.291

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

The first table shows his numbers during 2013. While the second one shows his entire career up to this point.

Straily's numbers didn't jump too crazy in 2013. However as you can see through his whole career, he was not an exception to the third AB rule. Watching the broadcast. It appears that A's pitching coach, Curt Young did phone the bullpen, but the broadcast did not show any A's relievers warming up. Please note that Dan Otero did start to warm up in the 5th after Peralta's home run.

I probably would've gone with Dan Otero to pitch this inning. The logic being that at the very least, you'll  probably keep the ball on the ground, since Straily, can be homer prone. Not to mention, Straily's your fourth starter, be happy that you got five innings out of him and give the game to your reliable bullpen.

It all worked out in this inning, and I'm sure the plan was to let Straily go out there and then take him out if he faced any trouble. Let's also remember that Straily started the inning at 64 pitches, so maybe Bob Melvin was hesitant to take him out.

-----------------------------

Our next decision point comes in the next half inning; the A's are up to bat with the bottom of the order due up, and the Tigers have pulled Doug Fister for Max Scherzer, a move that slots Justin Verlander for game five if the Tigers win.

Decision Point #2: Making Eric Sogard Lay Down a Sacrifice Bunt

Some of you are probably thinking I'm long-winded for including this one. And honestly, I don't remember being outraged about this while watching the game live (though I'll admit, my philosophy on baseball has changed a whole lot since then) but looking at it now; I must show some criticism of this decision.

Look; I get the logic. Eric Sogard's no triple crown winner, Max Scherzer's on the mound, Coco Crisp is on deck, and Sogard's one of the few guys on the team who can lay down a bunt.

And I know, using this logic, things sort of kind of "worked out." Though I believe, that's a conservative strategy, especially in a postseason game where you still need nine more outs.

Playing for one run when that run most likely won't win you the game is dumb. Just plain and simple, it's stupid.

And ironically, Melvin was criticized by some pundits for a bunt decision in game 2. That decision would prove to be forgotten because the A's would go on to win that particular game.

Here was the situation in that game. Just for the sake of discussion.

For more reading on that one, I suggest subscribing to the Joe Sheehan Newsletter, because it'll make you a smarter baseball fan. (There's my cheap plug)

That decision in game 2 was a lot worse than this one, but this decision to bunt in game four still stinks and here's why.

Eric Sogard grounded into four double plays in 2013. This uncommon result is because he's a left-handed hitter with decent speed. So even if Sogard hits one on the ground up the middle, there's a good chance that Sogard beats out the relay throw.

Not to mention, Sogard had quietly been a fly ball hitter in 2013, hitting it in the air 39.8% of the time vs. 35.4% on the ground.

Scherzer, on the other hand, was allowing balls in the air 44.6% of the time, which is on the par with the rest of his career, being an extreme fly ball pitcher.

So chances are, Eric Sogard won't ground into a double play and kill a rally. And let's not forget Max Scherzer is coming into the game as a reliever for the first time in two years, and he had already given up a single to Stephen Vogt. Why give up an out and help him?

And yes, I understand that Detroit's corner infield combo of Prince Fielder and Miguel Cabrera is by no means an athletic tag team, but those twos are a reason to bunt for hits, not sacrifice bunt. (I stole this point from Joe Sheehan, sue me)

You play for one run, and that's all you're gonna get if you're lucky. And that's what happened in this inning as Coco Crisp continued his big day bringing home Vogt to give the A's the lead. Despite this seeming like a pivotal run, this one run strategy allowed Scherzer to settle in a bit, instead of to put your foot on his throat when you had the opportunity to do just that.

For a side note: Josh Donaldson was up next, and Melvin didn't send Coco Crisp to try to get him into scoring position. I'll defer to Melvin on this one since I guess Melvin didn't want to screw up Donaldson's concentration.

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Then came the awful bottom of the 7th inning where Sean Doolittle had a rough time, and the controversial Victor Martinez home run happened that some say shouldn't have happened. And if you need any evidence that MLB should ban any seats from being in the field of play, this is it. Just ridiculous, but credit to Martinez for hitting a tough pitch away for an opposite field home run on his weaker side of the plate.

If there's anything to criticize, it's making Doolittle face Austin Jackson, when bringing in Dan Otero and closing the platoon advantage probably would've made the most sense.

I	Split	PA	AB	H	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHP	2624	2389	663	189	620	.278	.331	.402	.733	.359
	vs LHP	1133	1003	262	109	264	.261	.336	.393	.729	.332

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

Here are Austin Jackson's career splits. Yes, I know, technically, Jackson has slightly better numbers against righties, but notice the high BABIP total is what sets this out of whack. So yes, bringing in Otero would've been a good move. Especially since Otero's breaking stuff would've been tough to read for Jackson but I don't want to spend too much time on that one.

Now we get to the decision that many of you are still fired up to discuss.

Fast forward to the top of the 8th, and Detroit has taken a 5-4 lead, and Max Scherzer has come out to pitch the inning. Due up for the A's are the following: Brandon Moss, Yoenis Cespedes, and Seth Smith

Decision Point #3: Waiting to Pinch Hit Alberto Callaspo

When many of you are reading this post and thinking of this particular game, this is the inning you think of most often. It was the ultimate LOB city. The final teAse. Here was the sequence.

It makes me sick even looking at this box score.

Bases loaded, nobody out, and no one scores.

Ironically, Jim Leyland nearly went to his lone lefty in the bullpen, Drew Smyly. Smyly's introduction would've brought a trio of pinch hitters: Chris Young, Derek Norris, and Alberto Callaspo.

Instead, Leyland decided to stick with Scherzer and hope for no contact. And that's exactly what he got.

I have no problem with Josh Reddick hitting, if Reddick makes contact, it's usually not a double play. Instead, it's probably a sacrifice fly.

The issue I have is keeping Stephen Vogt up there to hit. Bear in mind, that Stephen Vogt was still a weak hitter at this point, Alberto Callaspo would've been the best option at the plate in that situation. Especially because you have two catchers on the bench that you can use.

Maybe, Melvin was looking too much into Vogt's at bat against Scherzer in the previous inning. Who knows? I just know that when you need a guy to make contact in that situation, Callaspo is clearly the better guy to do that than Stephen Vogt.

Callaspo's numbers in 2013 when it comes to putting the ball in play

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	PA	HR%	SO%	BB%	SO/W	GB/FB	IP%	LD%
2013	30	TOT	AL	516	1.9%	9.1%	10.3%	0.89	0.68	78%	26%
MLB Averages					2.6%	18.7%	8.2%	2.27	0.81	69%	21%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

Now here's Stephen Vogt's numbers in that year.

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	PA	HR%	SO%	BB%	SO/W	GB/FB	IP%
2013	28	OAK	AL	148	2.7%	18.9%	6.1%	3.11	0.41	71%
2015	30	OAK	AL	511	3.5%	19.0%	11.0%	1.73	0.61	66%
MLB Averages					2.5%	20.1%	7.8%	2.58	0.84	68%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

I left the 2015 numbers in here to remind everyone that this isn't the same Stephen Vogt as the one we saw in 2015. The 2013 Stephen Vogt was a much more bad hitter with a lot of holes in his swing. I want people to look at the IP%. This metric looks at the number of times you put a ball in play for every at bat. We see that 78% of the time Callaspo can do this, versus 71% in limited at bats for Vogt. What's holding down Callaspo from being even higher is more interesting. He's only striking out 9.1% of the time versus 18.9% for Vogt. And Callaspo even has a higher walk rate than Vogt. So put that all together, and there's a 91% chance that Callaspo will do something besides striking out. I like those odds.

My move would've been, pinch hit Callaspo for Vogt, and then bring in Kurt Suzuki to catch. This step makes it, so you still have an ace in the hole with Derek Norris, and that allows you to use him whenever Leyland decides to bring in Smyly.

Instead, Melvin brought in Callaspo for Sogard, and this was not only one batter too late, but was also a move that sacrificed defense.

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Now for the final big decision point. The one that I still haven't gotten over, and probably will never get over.

We turn to the bottom of the 8th, Ryan Cook has recorded two outs, but has now given up a single and a walk consecutively, and now a lefty in Alex Avila is coming to the plate. Tigers lead 5-4.

Decision Point Number 4: Bringing in Brett Anderson

What an awful decision. Here's the sequence.

WELP.

Why would you put Brett Anderson on the postseason roster? Let alone bring him in for this situation?

Why? Where's the logic? Find me some logic.

Brett Anderson had an awful 2013 season, marred by injuries and real ineffectiveness. Billy Beane and the brain trust tried to make him a reliever late in 2013, and the experiment was a failure, but they didn't cut their losses in October.

First off, Brett Anderson isn't even a guy who neutralized left-handed hitters.

I	Split	G	PA	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHB	122	2050	1877	481	91	4	46	31	17	141	375	2.66	.256	.311	.383	.693	.297
	vs LHB	120	778	726	215	26	3	13	10	11	38	127	3.34	.296	.338	.394	.732	.343

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

There's a reason for this, and the reason for this is that his backfoot slider which was so nasty during game 3 of the 2012 ALDS breaks into right-handed hitters. So if you miss against righties, you miss off the plate, rather than out over the plate. Throwing it against lefties can be a death sentence. Quite simply, Anderson's breaking pitches do not exploit the lefty on lefty matchup making him ineffective.

Here's the guy you should've brought in to face Alex Avila.

Yeah, that's right. Jerry Blevins. An actual real reliever, what a concept.

I still don't know why Melvin didn't go with this route. And even when he did, he had a chance to rectify the decision by pulling Anderson and bringing in Grant Balfour to face Omar Infante. To me, bringing in Balfour in that situation, and hoping you score a run would've been ideal, you can't leave your closer on the bench in a game like this. You just can't.

Just for classroom demonstration, here are Omar Infante's splits.

I	Split	G	GS	PA	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHP	1277		3871	3581	976	165	36	51	201	536	.273	.311	.381	.692	.306
	vs LHP	691		1678	1556	419	86	16	31	86	217	.269	.305	.405	.710	.293

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

C'mon, Melvin. Do better.

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The 9th inning would come, and the A's would tag Tigers closer, Joaquin Benoit for two runs on the bat of Cespedes. The A's would get the tying run to the plate but then fall short by a score of 8-6.

We all know what would happen in game 5, Verlander, that's all that needs to be said. I always tell people, we should've never played game 5; and the A's  had the Tigers on the ropes, and we let them off.

And unfortunately, I believe this game had a tremendous lasting impact on Billy Beane's psyche going forward, and I think this game was one of the reasons why he targeted Jeff Samardzija and Jon Lester during the trade deadline of 2015.

Now, what did I miss? Were there any decisions I needed to mention? Am I too harsh on Melvin? What would you have done differently? Please let me know.