A's Postseason Decision Points: Game 4 of the 2013 ALDS

Hello, A's fans, I've been thinking about doing a series like this, but I just didn't have the courage to look back at these games that have a scarring impact on my mind as an A's fan.

Here goes nothing.

I'll be looking back at decisive games where controversial decisions were made or not made, and I'll be giving my opinion on whether the right managerial decisions were made during these games. It's Monday Morning Quarterbacking done years later.

For some, this may be a tough walk down memory lane, for others, I hope it provides a little bit of clarity for what is usually a difficult subject to bring up.

So let's go back to the 2013 ALDS. The A's were in a series with the Detroit Tigers, and the A's led the series 2-1.

The 2013 A's were a team that gave the franchise some validation for their 2012 success, they would win a highly contested pennant race against the Texas Rangers and secure their second consecutive division title by winning 96 games.

Josh Donaldson had his breakout season, Jed Lowrie had a career year in Oakland, Coco Crisp went 20/20, and Bartolo Colon proved to be the ageless wonder in an incredible season at the age of 40 years old.

Bob Melvin's team was on a collision course with the team that had eliminated them the previous season, the Detroit Tigers.

And the first two games in Oakland were one-run contests where runs were at a premium. The teams would split the first two games and head to Detroit with the series even at 1.

In game three, the narrative would shift entirely with the A's hitting three home runs and hit around Anibal Sanchez to give the A's a pivotal 6-3 victory and give the A's a shot to wrap it all up the following day in Detroit.

At this point in the series, Miguel Cabrera was struggling to make any impact on the series thanks to a bum hamstring. And to that point, only Omar Infante was providing any real offensive firepower for the Tigers. The A's had hit four home runs in the series altogether while the Tigers hadn't homered at all.

For game 4, Dan Straily would take the hill for the A's and Doug Fister would oppose him for the Tigers. Straily at that time was still a guy who was considered to be a potentially solid Major League contributor since he was missing plenty of bats. And with the lack of decent starting pitchers with swing and miss stuff, the A's saw him as a good matchup for game 4.

And through the top of the 5th inning, the A's looked to be in control with the score 3-0, and Dan Straily was looking dominant. All thanks to Jed Lowrie and Coco Crisp. Lowrie would drive in Crisp in the first thanks to Coco's leadoff triple, and then Lowrie would homer off of Fister in the 5th with Crisp on first to give the A's a 3-0 lead.

Then came the bottom of the 5th. And that went something like this.

Fielder's hit to lead off the inning was the first hit that Straily had given up all day. Then Straily would give Victor Martinez a belt-high fastball that he'd get through the hole. And then on the big blow from Peralta, Straily questionably threw a 2-2 belt high fastball that was crushed for a game-tying 3-run home run. The broadcast booth of Buck Martinez and Dennis Eckersley questioned the call to throw that pitch, citing that Straily's slider had been on all afternoon.

The A's would then go quietly through the top of the 6th.

Then we get to our first decision point of the day.

Decision Point #1: Letting Straily face the top of the Tigers Order for the 3rd Time

From the surface, you may be wondering why I'm adding this into the mix of discussion since it wasn't an eventful inning by any means. However, just because things worked out, doesn't necessarily mean it was the right decision.

Starting Pitchers struggle when facing a lineup the third time through. Here's how Dan Straily fared when the lineup has turned over a few times.

Split	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	ROE	BAbip
1st PA in G, as SP	27	243	219	15	44	4	0	8	20	51	2.55	.201	.272	.329	.600	1	.222
2nd PA in G, as SP	27	242	217	28	53	9	0	7	21	48	2.29	.244	.317	.382	.699	4	.284
3rd PA in G, as SP	25	149	125	21	32	9	0	1	16	25	1.56	.256	.347	.352	.699	2	.304

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

I	Split	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	1st PA in G, as SP	45	405	361	37	78	8	1	18	1	0	36	88	2.44	.216	.295	.393	.688	.233
	2nd PA in G, as SP	45	404	366	43	84	16	0	13	1	1	33	82	2.48	.230	.296	.380	.676	.261
	3rd PA in G, as SP	43	246	205	36	54	15	1	6	0	2	30	38	1.27	.263	.365	.434	.799	.291

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

The first table shows his numbers during 2013. While the second one shows his entire career up to this point.

Straily's numbers didn't jump too crazy in 2013. However as you can see through his whole career, he was not an exception to the third AB rule. Watching the broadcast. It appears that A's pitching coach, Curt Young did phone the bullpen, but the broadcast did not show any A's relievers warming up. Please note that Dan Otero did start to warm up in the 5th after Peralta's home run.

I probably would've gone with Dan Otero to pitch this inning. The logic being that at the very least, you'll  probably keep the ball on the ground, since Straily, can be homer prone. Not to mention, Straily's your fourth starter, be happy that you got five innings out of him and give the game to your reliable bullpen.

It all worked out in this inning, and I'm sure the plan was to let Straily go out there and then take him out if he faced any trouble. Let's also remember that Straily started the inning at 64 pitches, so maybe Bob Melvin was hesitant to take him out.

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Our next decision point comes in the next half inning; the A's are up to bat with the bottom of the order due up, and the Tigers have pulled Doug Fister for Max Scherzer, a move that slots Justin Verlander for game five if the Tigers win.

Decision Point #2: Making Eric Sogard Lay Down a Sacrifice Bunt

Some of you are probably thinking I'm long-winded for including this one. And honestly, I don't remember being outraged about this while watching the game live (though I'll admit, my philosophy on baseball has changed a whole lot since then) but looking at it now; I must show some criticism of this decision.

Look; I get the logic. Eric Sogard's no triple crown winner, Max Scherzer's on the mound, Coco Crisp is on deck, and Sogard's one of the few guys on the team who can lay down a bunt.

And I know, using this logic, things sort of kind of "worked out." Though I believe, that's a conservative strategy, especially in a postseason game where you still need nine more outs.

Playing for one run when that run most likely won't win you the game is dumb. Just plain and simple, it's stupid.

And ironically, Melvin was criticized by some pundits for a bunt decision in game 2. That decision would prove to be forgotten because the A's would go on to win that particular game.

Here was the situation in that game. Just for the sake of discussion.

For more reading on that one, I suggest subscribing to the Joe Sheehan Newsletter, because it'll make you a smarter baseball fan. (There's my cheap plug)

That decision in game 2 was a lot worse than this one, but this decision to bunt in game four still stinks and here's why.

Eric Sogard grounded into four double plays in 2013. This uncommon result is because he's a left-handed hitter with decent speed. So even if Sogard hits one on the ground up the middle, there's a good chance that Sogard beats out the relay throw.

Not to mention, Sogard had quietly been a fly ball hitter in 2013, hitting it in the air 39.8% of the time vs. 35.4% on the ground.

Scherzer, on the other hand, was allowing balls in the air 44.6% of the time, which is on the par with the rest of his career, being an extreme fly ball pitcher.

So chances are, Eric Sogard won't ground into a double play and kill a rally. And let's not forget Max Scherzer is coming into the game as a reliever for the first time in two years, and he had already given up a single to Stephen Vogt. Why give up an out and help him?

And yes, I understand that Detroit's corner infield combo of Prince Fielder and Miguel Cabrera is by no means an athletic tag team, but those twos are a reason to bunt for hits, not sacrifice bunt. (I stole this point from Joe Sheehan, sue me)

You play for one run, and that's all you're gonna get if you're lucky. And that's what happened in this inning as Coco Crisp continued his big day bringing home Vogt to give the A's the lead. Despite this seeming like a pivotal run, this one run strategy allowed Scherzer to settle in a bit, instead of to put your foot on his throat when you had the opportunity to do just that.

For a side note: Josh Donaldson was up next, and Melvin didn't send Coco Crisp to try to get him into scoring position. I'll defer to Melvin on this one since I guess Melvin didn't want to screw up Donaldson's concentration.

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Then came the awful bottom of the 7th inning where Sean Doolittle had a rough time, and the controversial Victor Martinez home run happened that some say shouldn't have happened. And if you need any evidence that MLB should ban any seats from being in the field of play, this is it. Just ridiculous, but credit to Martinez for hitting a tough pitch away for an opposite field home run on his weaker side of the plate.

If there's anything to criticize, it's making Doolittle face Austin Jackson, when bringing in Dan Otero and closing the platoon advantage probably would've made the most sense.

I	Split	PA	AB	H	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHP	2624	2389	663	189	620	.278	.331	.402	.733	.359
	vs LHP	1133	1003	262	109	264	.261	.336	.393	.729	.332

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/19/2015.

Here are Austin Jackson's career splits. Yes, I know, technically, Jackson has slightly better numbers against righties, but notice the high BABIP total is what sets this out of whack. So yes, bringing in Otero would've been a good move. Especially since Otero's breaking stuff would've been tough to read for Jackson but I don't want to spend too much time on that one.

Now we get to the decision that many of you are still fired up to discuss.

Fast forward to the top of the 8th, and Detroit has taken a 5-4 lead, and Max Scherzer has come out to pitch the inning. Due up for the A's are the following: Brandon Moss, Yoenis Cespedes, and Seth Smith

Decision Point #3: Waiting to Pinch Hit Alberto Callaspo

When many of you are reading this post and thinking of this particular game, this is the inning you think of most often. It was the ultimate LOB city. The final teAse. Here was the sequence.

It makes me sick even looking at this box score.

Bases loaded, nobody out, and no one scores.

Ironically, Jim Leyland nearly went to his lone lefty in the bullpen, Drew Smyly. Smyly's introduction would've brought a trio of pinch hitters: Chris Young, Derek Norris, and Alberto Callaspo.

Instead, Leyland decided to stick with Scherzer and hope for no contact. And that's exactly what he got.

I have no problem with Josh Reddick hitting, if Reddick makes contact, it's usually not a double play. Instead, it's probably a sacrifice fly.

The issue I have is keeping Stephen Vogt up there to hit. Bear in mind, that Stephen Vogt was still a weak hitter at this point, Alberto Callaspo would've been the best option at the plate in that situation. Especially because you have two catchers on the bench that you can use.

Maybe, Melvin was looking too much into Vogt's at bat against Scherzer in the previous inning. Who knows? I just know that when you need a guy to make contact in that situation, Callaspo is clearly the better guy to do that than Stephen Vogt.

Callaspo's numbers in 2013 when it comes to putting the ball in play

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	PA	HR%	SO%	BB%	SO/W	GB/FB	IP%	LD%
2013	30	TOT	AL	516	1.9%	9.1%	10.3%	0.89	0.68	78%	26%
MLB Averages					2.6%	18.7%	8.2%	2.27	0.81	69%	21%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

Now here's Stephen Vogt's numbers in that year.

Year	Age	Tm	Lg	PA	HR%	SO%	BB%	SO/W	GB/FB	IP%
2013	28	OAK	AL	148	2.7%	18.9%	6.1%	3.11	0.41	71%
2015	30	OAK	AL	511	3.5%	19.0%	11.0%	1.73	0.61	66%
MLB Averages					2.5%	20.1%	7.8%	2.58	0.84	68%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

I left the 2015 numbers in here to remind everyone that this isn't the same Stephen Vogt as the one we saw in 2015. The 2013 Stephen Vogt was a much more bad hitter with a lot of holes in his swing. I want people to look at the IP%. This metric looks at the number of times you put a ball in play for every at bat. We see that 78% of the time Callaspo can do this, versus 71% in limited at bats for Vogt. What's holding down Callaspo from being even higher is more interesting. He's only striking out 9.1% of the time versus 18.9% for Vogt. And Callaspo even has a higher walk rate than Vogt. So put that all together, and there's a 91% chance that Callaspo will do something besides striking out. I like those odds.

My move would've been, pinch hit Callaspo for Vogt, and then bring in Kurt Suzuki to catch. This step makes it, so you still have an ace in the hole with Derek Norris, and that allows you to use him whenever Leyland decides to bring in Smyly.

Instead, Melvin brought in Callaspo for Sogard, and this was not only one batter too late, but was also a move that sacrificed defense.

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Now for the final big decision point. The one that I still haven't gotten over, and probably will never get over.

We turn to the bottom of the 8th, Ryan Cook has recorded two outs, but has now given up a single and a walk consecutively, and now a lefty in Alex Avila is coming to the plate. Tigers lead 5-4.

Decision Point Number 4: Bringing in Brett Anderson

What an awful decision. Here's the sequence.

WELP.

Why would you put Brett Anderson on the postseason roster? Let alone bring him in for this situation?

Why? Where's the logic? Find me some logic.

Brett Anderson had an awful 2013 season, marred by injuries and real ineffectiveness. Billy Beane and the brain trust tried to make him a reliever late in 2013, and the experiment was a failure, but they didn't cut their losses in October.

First off, Brett Anderson isn't even a guy who neutralized left-handed hitters.

I	Split	G	PA	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	SB	CS	BB	SO	SO/W	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHB	122	2050	1877	481	91	4	46	31	17	141	375	2.66	.256	.311	.383	.693	.297
	vs LHB	120	778	726	215	26	3	13	10	11	38	127	3.34	.296	.338	.394	.732	.343

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

There's a reason for this, and the reason for this is that his backfoot slider which was so nasty during game 3 of the 2012 ALDS breaks into right-handed hitters. So if you miss against righties, you miss off the plate, rather than out over the plate. Throwing it against lefties can be a death sentence. Quite simply, Anderson's breaking pitches do not exploit the lefty on lefty matchup making him ineffective.

Here's the guy you should've brought in to face Alex Avila.

Yeah, that's right. Jerry Blevins. An actual real reliever, what a concept.

I still don't know why Melvin didn't go with this route. And even when he did, he had a chance to rectify the decision by pulling Anderson and bringing in Grant Balfour to face Omar Infante. To me, bringing in Balfour in that situation, and hoping you score a run would've been ideal, you can't leave your closer on the bench in a game like this. You just can't.

Just for classroom demonstration, here are Omar Infante's splits.

I	Split	G	GS	PA	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	BAbip
	vs RHP	1277		3871	3581	976	165	36	51	201	536	.273	.311	.381	.692	.306
	vs LHP	691		1678	1556	419	86	16	31	86	217	.269	.305	.405	.710	.293

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/20/2015.

C'mon, Melvin. Do better.

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The 9th inning would come, and the A's would tag Tigers closer, Joaquin Benoit for two runs on the bat of Cespedes. The A's would get the tying run to the plate but then fall short by a score of 8-6.

We all know what would happen in game 5, Verlander, that's all that needs to be said. I always tell people, we should've never played game 5; and the A's  had the Tigers on the ropes, and we let them off.

And unfortunately, I believe this game had a tremendous lasting impact on Billy Beane's psyche going forward, and I think this game was one of the reasons why he targeted Jeff Samardzija and Jon Lester during the trade deadline of 2015.

Now, what did I miss? Were there any decisions I needed to mention? Am I too harsh on Melvin? What would you have done differently? Please let me know.