I've tried to write something about this several times, but I've ended up stopping because I fear that I'll go crazy trying to digest it again.
I finally finished watching that awful game again. That same game that left me wide-eyed in a San Leandro pub with all my friends. Plenty of the emotions that I experienced that night were reborn on this night. I was planning on making a sequel to the first edition of this series, which was Game 4 of the 2013 ALDS, that was easier, for some reason. That game had a lot of easy things to analyze which made me quite critical of Bob Melvin's managing in that matchup.
I expected to find the same things in this game, and honestly, I was wrong. I did find a few decision points to dive into, but it's not the scathing review that I gave Bob Melvin in the last edition. Instead, I discovered that he was very unlucky and that the players on the field just didn't execute.
This game stung more because of all the build up that happened with the mid-season trades, and the massive regression during the last two months of the season. And with the loss, we'd later find out that this game had closed the championship window for that particular core of A's players. The Donaldson, Moss, Reddick, and Crisp Oakland A's had seen the last of their opportunities of making a big October playoff run. And that's what stung more than anything else.
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Our first decision point rears its head in the 8th inning, but here's a brief recap.
The A's were hitting Royals starter, James Shields, quite hard, most notably, Brandon Moss' 2-run home run.
Then the Royals exploited Jon Lester's inability to hold runners on, combined with the injury to Geovany Soto, and the writing was on the wall for future trouble.
The Royals would take the lead in the 3rd, and afterward, Lester would find his groove, after finding his curveball.
Then Royals manager, Ned Yost, went completely brain dead with probably one of the worst decisions I can remember during the postseason. As an in-game tactical manager, he's better than Ron Washington, maybe better than Dusty Baker, but only just.
He had already tried a little league set play with Billy Butler trying to draw a throw, and that predictably failed, so he had to top it with another dumb decision.
With Brandon Moss up with two men on, Yost pulled Shields and went to Yordano Ventura, who was making his first appearance out of the bullpen. What made it even worse was that Ventura was on one day's rest, and he was coming in with runners on base. All of it seemed terrible, and Brandon Moss made Yost pay with a 3-run home run to put the A's in front. The A's would stretch the lead to 7-3 by the end of the 6th, and the A's seemed to have an insurmountable lead, thanks to Ned Yost's huge gaff. He should've brought in his dynamite reliever, Kelvin Herrera, and the only reason he didn't, is because it wasn't the 7th inning, so there you have it.
Jon Lester would cruise through the sixth and seventh innings, bringing the A's within six outs of advancing to the ALDS.
Decision Point #1: Letting Lester go out for the 8th
Here's Lester's pitching line after 7: 94 pitches, 7.0 IP, 25 BF, 6 H, 3 ER, 5 K, 1 BB, 57 Game Score.
That's a solid outing.
Lester had retired 13 of the last 14 since giving up runs in the 3rd. He was on a roll, and in those innings, he looked more like we hoped he would. And with a 4 run lead, myself, and everyone around me at the pub were convinced that Jon Lester should go out for the 8th. He had shown no signs of struggling in the early part of the game, and I also think that our biases about the postseason and how you're supposed to use your ace in a game like this crept into our minds.
The truth is, we were wrong. We were wrong in hindsight, but we were all wrong, and so was Bob Melvin.
The bottom line is that after a starting pitcher goes through the batting order more than three times, he becomes dramatically less effective compared to the first couple times. All due to fatigue and the opposing batters seeing the starter's repertoire enough times to pick up on it.
Jon Lester was facing the Royals batting order for the 4th time. That should've been enough for Melvin to swallow his instincts about letting your ace win you the game, and do the practical thing and bring in your rested bullpen with a four-run lead.
Even if he made Lester start the 8th, he should've been given a quick hook. Instead, he faced six extra batters. Melvin's not alone in making this mistake, many of his colleagues make the same mistake in managing like it's 1911, but let's hope that this reinforces the point over time.
That brings us to our next decision.
Decision Point #2: Using Luke Gregerson with runners on base
| I | Split | G | PA | AB | 2B | 3B | HR | SB | CS | BB | SO | tOPS+ | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RISP | 240 | 524 | 452 | 22 | 4 | 13 | 9 | 0 | 51 | 114 | 2.24 | .221 | .307 | .374 | .681 | .264 | 128 | |
| --- | 441 | 1114 | 1043 | 40 | 2 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 303 | 4.66 | .200 | .251 | .300 | .551 | .263 | 85 |
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 2/28/2016.
I would've brought Gregerson in, to start the inning, but he was the wrong guy in this situation, because of his pitching repertoire. His slider is one that often finds the dirt, and with runners on base, there's added pressure to block his pitches, and there's even some tendency to stray away from his slider in this situation which is a trend that would severely neuter the effectiveness of Luke Gregerson.
Gregerson would end up threading the needle with this slider; one ended up being a wild pitch that brought in the Royals' 6th run while the others produced back to back strikeouts that ended the inning.
Here's the sequence of the inning.
Instead of letting Lester pitch to Hosmer, I would've taken him out after he gave up the hit to Cain. And in that position, there're two ways to go about it. First, he could've gone to Dan Otero to try and bring in a guy who could produce a ground ball. Or he could've brought in Sean Doolittle his closer to try and get a five out save.
I would've brought in Sean Doolittle. Doolittle's your best reliever and this was the highest leverage situation you could draw up. Doolittle had 14 career appearances up to that point where he recorded 5 or more outs and in those appearances, he hadn't given up a single run. That proves he was not only capable of getting the job done. There's no reason to limit players to one inning, especially in the playoffs, where it's not only useful, but it should be recommended and done more often.
The 8th inning was a rough one for Melvin, and I worry that this example shows that he can't adapt on the fly when he needs to do so. Let's remember that Bob Melvin was the bench coach for Bob Brenly's Arizona Diamondbacks. Bob Brenly is widely known as one of the worst managers to win a World Series, and no one did more to hurt their team's championship hopes. I always worry that Melvin will manage like Bob Brenly in the worst possible moments, though for the most part, Bob Melvin doesn't resemble Bob Brenly.
ESPN's Keith Law mentioned the day after this game that when Melvin was in Arizona, he wasn't committed to bullpen roles. Though in this particular case he clearly did, it was the 8th inning, so he naturally went to Luke Gregerson, even though the circumstances didn't support doing so.
These first two points were my main criticisms of Melvin's managing in this particular game.
Decision Point #3 Bringing in Jonny Gomes to play the OF
The bottom of the 11th saw Coco Crisp forced out of the game, and Bob Melvin was forced to go to replace him. He had two clear choices: Jonny Gomes and Billy Burns. Melvin chose Jonny Gomes, and this happened in the bottom of the 12th.
Upon replay, the ball was uncatchable. What's clear though is that Gomes' inexperience in the outfield was exposed on this plate, he wasn't backing up Fuld, and instead was going to the ball. And that decision allowed Eric Hosmer to go to third and score on the next play.
I would've worked with Billy Burns. And I said that when the decision was made at the time. Mostly due to the fact Jonny Gomes has no defensive value, he has some value at the plate against lefties, but his spot was six spots away, and Jonny Gomes never got to bat in this game. And since the Royals had already used their lone lefty in Brandon Finnegan, Jonny Gomes would've been batting with no platoon advantage, which compromises any value he has in playing at all.
With Billy Burns, you get a tremendous outfield range with Burns, Fuld, and Reddick. There's no doubt that Hosmer is going to get an extra base hit, no matter who's out there on the field, but with Billy Burns and Sam Fuld playing, there's probably a better chance that Hosmer is held to a double.
Maybe that doesn't change the result in the game, but this decision also seemed to be a head-scratcher in a somewhat minor realm.
Decision Point #4: Hammel and Not Samardzija
This falls on Billy Beane and the brain trust who made the roster. And I figured it was worth noting. Jeff Samardzija was left off the roster, having pitched on Saturday and was slotted to start game one of the ALDS if the A's had won the wildcard game.
You can see why this was done. Using Samardzija in this game would've compromised him for the first couple games of the division series and probably would've meant that he Though I still think you have to keep your best players on the roster and try to win the coin flip game and then figure things out later.
Beane was likely trying to make sure that Scott Kazmir didn't have to pitch in game one, especially with how the Angels destroyed him weeks before. Though you still could've had a rotation like this in the ALDS.
Game One: Scott Kazmir or Jason Hammel
Game Two: Sonny Gray
Game Three: Jon Lester
Game Four: Jeff Samardzija
Game Five: Sonny Gray
Decision Point #5: Adam Dunn Rotting on the Bench
This talking point was something that came up again, and again, mostly for sentimental reasons. Since this would end up being Adam Dunn's last game of his career. And in that career, he had never played a single game in the postseason, so this was his chance. The problem was simple, how could Bob Melvin get him into the game? Brandon Moss' hip was so banged up that he could only DH, and that's a no brainer, you put Brandon Moss out there over a 35-year-old, Adam Dunn. And that decision was rewarded when Brandon Moss hit two home runs in this game. And when a player hits two home runs in one single game, in the one place where Adam Dunn can play, there's not much you can do; sentimental reasons be damned.
With that said, there're two instances where he could've potentially had been brought in and here's the first one of contention.
With the bases loaded and Jed Lowrie at the plate, the thinking from some was that this was the time to bring in Adam Dunn and go for the kill. The problem with this way of thinking is that Adam Dunn is an all-or-nothing hitter and more of a nothing hitter at this stage of his career. And in reality, what you need is a single that will likely bring in two runs and give you a three-run lead heading into the bottom of the 9th. Getting a single from Jed Lowrie is much more likely than getting ANY hit from Adam Dunn, especially against one of the best flame-throwing relievers in the game, Greg Holland. This was not the spot to use him.
And then there's the second possible spot.
You could've brought Adam Dunn in for Alberto Callaspo in this situation, but that tactically doubtful move worked out anyway. Bob Melvin said after the game that the Royals likely would've walked Dunn and that would've been a complete waste of a roster spot because then you'd have to let Adam Dunn play first where he'll play below average defense. Again, not the spot to bring him in.
In review, Bob Melvin got it right by not bringing Adam Dunn in, it's a shame, but there was no right spot to bring him in.
Aftermath
If you're looking for reasons to hold Bob Melvin's feet to the fire, this is not the game to do it. I'm a guy who's not 100% sold on Melvin, but overall, he was extremely unlucky in this game. I believe he got the 8th inning wrong, but the truth is, most MLB managers haven't exactly understood how their precious starting pitchers get dramatically less effective the more times through the order they go through. I'll hold it against him, but the one I'm more upset about is how he threw Luke Gregerson into an awful situation, and that's something he had been doing all year long, sadly.
This loss hurts even more to this day because of what has happened since then with the Giants somehow winning another World Series in ways that will only be described as variance. I hope everyone enjoyed this review, or somehow found some closure on that awful night in Kansas City, hopefully, the A's will be back in the playoffs sooner rather than later.
----- Wes
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